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This paper explores the impact on water demand of the adoption of deficit and precision 
irrigation as a farmer’s attempt to respond to water scarcity by maximising water 
productivity. The case study is characterised by the intensive use of deficit irrigation 
techniques in olive groves, which account for 50 per cent of all irrigated land in 
southern Spain. These technologies have an important influence on the structure of the 
water demand. This study reveals that following the adoption of such technologies, 
water demand does not respond to moderate changes in water price, unless price 
increases become so great that they reach a threshold price representing a 
disproportionate and unaffordable social impact. This fact has significant consequences 
for water policy as water pricing becomes an ineffective instrument for managing water 
demand in a context characterised by resource scarcity and farmers’ adoption of deficit 
irrigation techniques.  
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Water pricing mechanisms are generally 
seen as one of the most important 
instruments for water demand 
management in the context of the over-
extraction of water. The use of water 
pricing is frequently proposed as a 
strategic tool for water policy,such as in 
the Water Framework Directive 
(European Commission 2000) and the 
Blueprint to Safeguard Europe's Water 
Resources (European Commission 
2012). Moreover, water pricing is seen 
by many environmental organisations as 
a social issue and even the agricultural 
subsidies linked to the European 
Common Agricultural Policy depend on 
water pricing and the implementation of 
cost-recovery  strategies. 
Advocates of water pricing generally 
put forward three arguments (Perry 
2001). First, it serves as a cost recovery 
instrument for water services. Second, it 
provides an incentive for the efficient 
use of scarce water resources, and third, 
it acts as a source of finance to continue 
providing essential water services in the 
future (Kumar and Singh 2001). 
Furthermore, water pricing is 
considered a suitable way of reflecting 
the economic and social value of the 
resource and of allocating it efficiently 
to different uses (Johansson 2000). 
This paper analyses the effectiveness of 
water pricing for irrigation water 
demand management in areas where 
deficit irrigation is a predominant 
strategy adopted by farmers in response 
to water scarcity. This paper attempts to 
analyse the behaviour of the water 
demand function and to estimate the 
subjective threshold price based on the 
subjective perceptions of a sample of 
farmers with intensive irrigated olive 
groves. Threshold estimates are 
obtained through marginal productive 
values of water, elicited from farmers’ 
subjective responses in three different 
irrigation scenarios. The next section 
briefly reviews the role of water pricing 
as an effective measure in water 
demand management under constrained 
supply. The third section presents our 
case study of intensive irrigated olive 
grove farmers in the Guadalquivir River 
Basin (southern Spain), followed by the 
presentation of our main results in 
section four. The fifth section provides 
an open discussion about the 
effectiveness of water pricing policies 
in the context under study. Finally, the 
paper ends with some concluding 
remarks. 
2. State of the art. 
The majority of water pricing related 
literature focuses on analysing farmers’ 
responsiveness to pricing pressures and 
how price policies prompt the 
implementation of more efficient water 
use techniques. Nevertheless, there is a 
growing body of literature that 
concludes that irrigation water demand 
has a very low elasticity and water 
pricing is not particularly effective at 
curtailing water demand. As the price of 
water is only rarely determined by the 
market, the analysis of water demand 
for irrigation becomes problematic. 
Consequently, the value of water needs 
to be derived by modelling an 
optimisation problem of farmers’ 
production function (Dinar and Letey 




Bernardo and Whittlesey (1989) used a 
mathematical programming model to 
show that farmers in Washington State 
substitute water with labour, by 
switching to a more water efficient 
mode of operation of their irrigation 
technology. Ogg and Hollegon (1989), 
using econometric curve fitting 
techniques, concluded that higher water 
costs will result in relatively modest 
reductions in per-hectare water use in 
western US. Regarding the analysis of 
alternative policies to curtail water use, 
Dinar and Letey (1996) developed an 
analytical model to compare the 
effectiveness of water pricing in four 
regions in California, arriving at the 
conclusion that water quantity reduction 
policies were more effective than water 
price policies. The impact of irrigation 
techniques also plays a significant role 
when the effectiveness of price policies 
is assessed, as shown in Varela-Ortega 
et al. (1998). They concluded that in 
highly efficient irrigation systems (i.e. 
drip) the response to increasing water 
prices was much lower than for 
inefficient irrigation schemes (i.e. 
surface gravity irrigation). The authors 
stated that, at least in the Spanish 
regions studied, irrigation technical 
endowment was a determining factor in 
explaining low responsiveness to water 
pricing among farmers under restricted 
water supply (demand inelasticity). 
Several other studies have also shown 
farmers’ limited responsiveness to low 
water prices under existing allocation 
practices (OECD 1999; Perry 2001; Ray 
2002).  
Nevertheless, it is still debatable 
whether or not water pricing is an 
effective measure in water demand 
management (De Fraiture and Perry 
2007). Several studies claim that 
irrigation water demand is inelastic 
below a threshold price, and elastic 
beyond it. This would mean that 
considerable price increases would be 
required to produce a reduction in 
demand, and such increases may 
involve important political 
considerations. 
In our case study, as is the case in many 
parts of the world, farmers do not freely 
decide on the amount of water they will 
use to irrigate their crops, as water 
access is restricted  by water rights (or 
fixed allocations). Under conditions of 
water scarcity and low water prices, the 
amount allocated is likely to be below 
the amount of water that farmers would 
be willing to take at the prevailing price, 
thus promoting the use of deficit-
irrigation techniques. This would 
encourage the use of irrigation doses 
that would maximise returns to water, 
rather than returns to land as proposed 
by English (1990) and illustrated, 
among others, by Expósito and Berbel 
(2016) and Berbel and Mateos (2014). 
Figure 1 shows the relation between 
water price and demand under a fixed-
allocation system. At low prices, water 
demand is constrained by fixed supply 
(Ws) and farmers optimise water use by 
choosing an appropriate crop, level of 
risk and efficient irrigation techniques, 
thus showing no response to price. 
Conversely, water demand becomes 
elastic to price at a certain threshold 
price. This is the point where price 
equals the productive value of an 
additional unit of water (water price 




Alternatively, if the price is set below 
the threshold and restricted supply is 
replaced by water pricing measures, 
farmers will divert more water, until the 
gap between price and the productive 
value of water is bridged.  
 
When deficit irrigation (DI) techniques 
are extensively adopted, farmers’ 
irrigation decisions are shown to be 
seeking a maximum return to water, as 
found by Exposito and Berbel 
(2016).This is because water is 
considered the fixed factor in this case, 
instead of the more conventional 
hypothesis that maximises return to 
land. Thus, under the predominance of 
deficit irrigation schemes, the allocated 
amount of water would fall from WS to 
WDI (Figure 1), shifting the theoretical 
threshold price upwards, after which 
point demand begins to show negative 
elasticity to price.  
As Figure 1 illustrates, water pricing 
would be effective only if the price is 
set above a certain threshold, which 
would be much higher when deficit 
irrigation techniques are extended in a 
context of restricted water supply, 
leading to significant reductions in 
farmers’ profits. In this regard, Berbel 
and Gómez-Limón (2000) stated that 
water consumption does not fall until 
prices reach such a level that farmers’ 
income is negatively affected. If water 
pricing is selected as a policy measure, 
farm income would decrease by around 
40% before water demand decreased 
significantly. Furthermore, Berbel, 
Pedraza and Giannocaro (2013) explain 
the trajectory towards closure of the 
Guadalquivir basin and that one way 
farmers respond to scarcity is to invest 
in more efficient high-technology 
irrigation,along with the widespread 
implementation of deficit irrigation 
techniques. The authors argue that 
significant consequences may occur at 
the basin or aquifer level when this 
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technique is adopted, including the low 
elasticity of water demand to price 
variations. 
In this regard, several empirical studies 
show that depending on the initial water 
price and the size of allocation, this 
threshold price may be several times the 
original price. Ray (2002) reported a 
sixfold price increase for India; and 
Perry (2001) estimated a tenfold 
increase for Iran. Furthermore, the 
concept of a threshold price is 
relative,depending on several 
agronomic factors (i.e. type of crop and 
land) and irrigation technology (i.e. 
gravity, sprinkler, drip); it is therefore 
essential to examine the nature and 
scope of the price threshold in order to 
assess the potential effectiveness of 
water pricing in certain agronomic 
locations (De Fraiture and Perry 2007). 
This point is especially significant in the 
case of highly efficient farmers (those 
who already use highly-efficient 
irrigation techniques, i.e. drip) and with 
respect to how their irrigation demand 
decisions are based on their subjective 
perceptions and beliefs. 
3. Materials. 
3.1 Case study.  
The case study selected to analyse 
farmers’ subjective beliefs about the 
water-yield relationship focuses on 
irrigated olive groves in Andalucia 
(southern Spain). The area under study 
forms part of the Guadalquivir River 
Basin, which is the longest river in 
southern Spain, 650 km in length and 
with a total combined length including 
both the river and its tributaries of 
around 10,700 km. The basin covers an 
area of 58,000 km2 with a population of 
4.1 million (the most populated cities 
are Seville, Cordoba and Granada). It 
has a Mediterranean climate with an 
uneven rainfall distribution (630 mm) 
and an average annual temperature of 
16.8 C (CHG 2010). Annual renewable 
resources are estimated at 7.1 109 m3 for 
surface waters and 2.6 109 m3 for 
groundwater. In 2015 (CHG 2016), per 
capita water consumption in the basin 
was 875 m3, and agriculture was the top 
consumer with 88% of the total. In 
2014, the Spanish agricultural area 
dedicated to irrigated olive trees 
amounted to 740,511 ha (Berbel and 
Gutierrez-Martín 2015). Though 
initially famers simply installed drip 
irrigation systems into existing 
traditional groves (100 trees per 
hectare), new irrigation technologies 
have allowed farmers to significantly 
increase tree densities in order to create 
intensive groves (between 250 and 300 
trees per hectare) or super-intensive 
groves (around 800 trees per hectare).  
3.2 Survey description. 
The focus of the research is intensive 
olive groves (around 275 trees per 
hectare) and is based on a survey of 
irrigated olive growers in the 
Guadalquivir River Basin regarding 
yield and irrigation doses per ha, among 
other data, in the period 2010-2013. The 
fieldwork was conducted in spring 2014 
with information given by 99 farmers of 
intensive olive groves. This crop is 
typically irrigated with DI technology 
and it represents around 50% of all 
irrigated land in the Guadalquivir River 
Basin, or 25% of total irrigated land in 
Spain. We have therefore selected this 
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crop as a relevant case study for the 
impact of DI on the effectiveness of 
water pricing. 
The original survey consisted of 99 
observations (farmers), and average 
values in the survey are: a) farm size: 40 
ha; b) density: 283 trees/ha; c) water 
rights: 2,723 m3/ha; and d) irrigation 
doses: 1,028 m3/ha. We observe a 
discrepancy here, as water use 
represents 38% of farmer water rights 
(1,028 / 2,723), indicating the 
prevalence of the dominant DI strategy 
among analysed farmers. Descriptive 
statistics of our survey (crop area, 
density, age of olive groves and 
assigned irrigation rights) are 
summarised in Table 1, together with 
information regarding average 
production (olive kilograms) and 
irrigation dose (m3) applied over the 
period under analysis. Although the 
variability within the sample seems 
high, the table shows that the observed 
farmers tend to apply an irrigation dose 
far smaller than that permitted 
according to their assigned water rights, 
displaying on average a preference for a 
scenario characterised by DI.  
 
 
An individual subjective water demand 
function has been elicited on an 
individual subjective water-yield curve 
in the 'normal' agronomic range 
(maximum yield should be within the 
normal range for the crop and region), 
as defined in Expósito and Berbel 
(2016). The answers given by farmers 
regarding their expectations as to water 
consumption (m3/ha) and yield (k/ha) in 
three possible irrigation scenarios 
(extreme DI, usual DI and full 
irrigation), make possible to estimate a 
quadratic production function Y(w) = 
a1 + b1·W + c1·W2, where Y represents 
yield and W the applied water dose. 
Based upon this subjective production 
function, the farmer’s water demand 
isequal to the marginal product value of 
water (MPV) defined by the following 
equation: 
MPV = P'y · dY/dW  = P'y · (b1 + 2·c1W)
  (1) 
In the above function, P'y is equal to the 
'net farm gate price' (i.e. price of olives 
minus harvesting cost) and parameters 
b1 and c1 depend on each farmer and 
each subjective production function 
(subject to b1>0; c1<0). A subjective 
water demand function has then been 
elicited for each individual farmer. As 
the demand function is a straight line, it 
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can be represented by two points: 1) the 
irrigation dose where maximum yield is 
achieved and marginal product value 
ofwater tends to be zero; 2) the 
marginal product value of water when 
irrigation dose tends to be zero. 
An example of a valid response from 
farmer number #61 is shown in Figure 
1. In this case, the maximum yield is 
reached with an irrigation dose of 3,685 
m3/ha (where the marginal product 
value of water is zero) and the 
maximum marginal product value of 
water is 2.74 EUR/m3 (where no 
irrigation is applied). From these two 
values, a subjective water demand 
function can be estimated. 
 
Following English (1990), the irrigation 
dose that maximises return to water in 
the case of Farmer #61 is 1,783 m3/ha, 
close to the usual irrigation dose applied 
by this farmer, which is 1,500 m3/ha 
with a water cost of 0.05 EUR/m3 in the 
period 2010-2013. As described by 
Expósito and Berbel (2016), this 
farmer’s behaviour is based on the usual 
application of deficit irrigation 
techniques that maximises return to 
water as the limited resource, and runs 
contrary to common microeconomic 
theory based on the maximisation of 
returns to land as the limiting 
productive factor. Based on this 
farmer’s usual irrigation dose of 1,500 
m3/ha, the estimated marginal 
productivity of water is 1.63 EUR/m3, 
meaning that this would be the 
threshold price at which this farmer’s 
water demand function becomes elastic 
with respect to price. As seen in the 
previous section, price movements 
below this threshold would not cause 
any variation in water demand, as it 
presents inelasticity in this section of 
the function. Furthermore, this water 
allocation is far below the average 
restricted water supply in our sample 
(average irrigation rights of 2,723 
m3/ha) and the average irrigation dose 
that maximises yield (3,685 m3/ha). 
Any price increase above the threshold 
would mean a reduction in the 
economic rent associated with water, as 
shown in Figure 2 by the area above the 
CP line and below the demand function. 
Any increase in the price of water in the 
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range 0.05-1.63 EUR/m3 would mean a 
reduction in the resource rent associated 
with water and thus, a reduction of  
Farmer #61’s surplus. Only price 
increases above 1.63 EUR/m3 would 
lead to a reduction in the applied 
irrigation dose to below 1,500 m3/ha.  
 
4. Results. 
From our initial sample of 99 farmers, 
21 were discarded as they provide 
information about only two levels of our 
elicited water-yield 
relationship,implying that it was not 
possible to estimate an elicited 
production function inthese cases. 
Additionally, 30 observations, despite 
providing information on the three 
irrigation levels, presented estimation 
errors (i.e. increasing returns to scale) 
and were therefore notconsidered valid 
responses. Consequently, our sample 
was reduced to 48 valid behavioural 
observations.  
Based on the valid observations, Table 
2 shows descriptive statistics of 
individual elicited threshold price of 
water given by the estimated marginal 
product value of water at the usual 
irrigation dose applied by each farmer, 
together with information regarding the 
current water cost. While the variability 
of the observations seems high, they all 
display a similar ‘rational’ response 
regarding irrigation decisions, the water 
production function exhibits decreasing 
returns to scale, and marginal values are 
similar to those observed and in line 
with agronomic experience (Mesa-
Jurado et al. 2010). The average 
estimated marginal product value 
associated with the average applied 
water dose in our sample shows that the 
threshold price would be around 1.2 
EUR/m3, which is 10 times the current 
average water cost paid by oursample 






As mentioned above, the threshold price 
is influenced by the technology choice 
adopted by the farmer and the existing 
water management practices in the river 
basin. These two factors usually lead to 
an evolution of the economic value of 
water characterized by an increase of 
the marginal product value of water. 
Further, when DI techniques are widely 
adopted, an increase of the threshold 
price also occurs. Consequently, the 
marginal product value of water and the 
threshold price determine the structure 
of water demand and evolve 
independently from water cost, which is 
related to supply evolution and water 
policy measures. Thus, in the irrigated 
olive case study, water cost would not 
be expected to play a key role in 
determining our farmers’ subjective 
water demand unless water price levels 
increase disproportionally and above the 
threshold price. Figure 3 shows water 
dose-water cost combinations wherein 
two groups can be seen. On the one 
hand, farmers that apply surface 
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irrigation with a cost of around 0.05 
EUR/m3, defined at a basin level by an 
administrative tariff plus the farmer 
distribution cost. In our farmers’ 
sample, these cases show a very 
homogeneous cost. The other group is 
circumscribed to farmers using 
groundwater and other surface sources, 
who face more heterogeneous and 
higher water costs. 
Figure 3 also illustrates our sample’s 
median water dose (1,042 m3/ha) and it 
can be seen that water dose-water cost 
combinations are randomly distributed 
around this line. In order to test the 
response of water demand to water cost 
among our sample of farmers, a 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
between water cost and applied 
irrigation dose in our farmers’ sample 
has been calculated showing that no 
correlation exists between these two 
variables (with p=-0.0089), therefore 
confirming the existence of a vertical 
demand curve until the water price 
reaches a threshold that is significantly 
higher than current water price level.  
The case of our sample’s median farmer 
is illustrated in Figure 4. In this case, 
the threshold price of water is estimated 
at 1.03 EUR/m3, which is far higher 
than the median cost of water (0.08 
EUR/m3) and our sample’s maximum 
value (0.30 EUR/m3). The grey shaded 
area represents the estimated economic 
rent associated with the resource and 
thus, with the farmer’s surplus obtained 
by the application of the DI technique. 
In this case, and taking the maximum 
observed cost of water in our sample 
(0.30 EUR/m3), the estimated economic 
rent would be equivalent to 1,099 
EUR/ha. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the water rent 
estimation, according to the definitions 
by Young and Loomis (2014). The 
figure shows marginal product value of 
water that is very close to those of 
Mesa-Jurado et al. (2010) who base 
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their analysis for irrigated olives in an 
agronomic empirically derived water-
yield response function, which is an 
alternative approach to our research that 
is based on subjective farmer beliefs. 
The similarity between our results based 
on farmer expectations and those based 
upon derivation of agronomic 
production function may be explained 
because farmers make their water 
volume decision considering scientific 
(agronomic field research) and 
administrative (the Basin Agency and 
Regional Government) information 
available and consequently, their 
personal experience may be reinforced 
by the knowledge from public domain 
explaining the convergence of farmer 
subjective expectations and public 
available agronomic functions. 
 
5. Discussion. 
The relevance of our analysis is based 
on the fact that the Guadalquivir basin 
is the most important river basin in 
Spain in terms of Gross Added Value 
(GVA) by irrigation and that around 
50% of the irrigated land in this basin 
consists of olive groves. The findings of 
our survey confirm that our farmers’ 
average water cost of 0.11 EUR/m3 is 
equal to the official figure for the 
Andalucia region (CAP 2011), and lies 
in the lower segment of the survey’s 
range (0.05-0.30).  
Furthermore, as our sample is composed 
of farmers of intensive olive groves, 
which use highly efficient irrigation 
schemes (i.e. drip), the inelasticity of 
water demand should be greater than 
with “more traditional” irrigation 
schemes (Varela-Ortega et al. 1998). 
So, the high technical capacity in our 
sample of farmers would have a major 
effect on their response to water pricing, 
pushing the threshold up far above the 
average current cost of 0.11 EUR/m3. 
All farmers in our survey have adopted 
a DI strategy, which has become the 
predominant technique in the 
Guadalquivir River Basin (CHG 2016). 
11 
 
One of the consequences of this 
behaviour is that water demand 
becomes inelastic with respect to price, 
as the DI dose implies a vertical 
demand function up to a threshold given 
by the marginal product value of water 
at this DI level. This demand function 
behaves as described by de Fraiture and 
Perry (2007), namely an inelastic 
function up to a threshold price due to 
water scarcity conditions. We agree 
with these authors as to the 
consequences of adopting a DI strategy, 
but the innovative contribution made by 
our research is that we show this 
behaviour to be a voluntary strategy 
aimed at maximising water 
productivity, according to English’s 
paradigm (English 1990). The question 
then becomes, how much can the farmer 
irrigate with a restricted volume of 
water? The response derived from our 
case study show that the applied 
irrigation dose is not determined by an 
external (administrative or natural) 
constraint as De Fraiture and Perry 
(2007) suggest, but by a deliberated and 
voluntary decision of farmers to 
maximise water productivity and profits 
through the adoption of a DI strategy. 
Current water policy in the European 
Union is strongly rooted in the use of 
water pricing as a critical instrument. In 
fact, this is the aim of the Art 9. In the 
Water Framework Directive (European 
Commission, 2000) that forces the 
Member State to estimate the cost 
recovery ratio of water services and the 
application of full cost recovery and the 
use of water pricing to incentive water 
saving by farmers. The strategic 
analysis made by ‘Blueprint for water 
Communication’ (European 
Commission, 2012) enforces this 
instrument and the revision of the made 
by the Member States for River Basin 
Program of Measures (European 
Commission, 2015) recently reclaims an 
increase in water price to control water 
use.   
The term water price is misleading as 
the water has not a price itself and 
markets are not fully developed in 
Spain. The terms should be changed to 
water tariff when the water comes from 
a public supply source or water cost 
when it is self-supply. 
The policy makers in Europe and 
elsewhere understands water pricing as 
an incentive related to how water users 
pay for their use, and whether the right 
price signals are transmitted, i.e. how 
water is being paid for, and how the 
water price affects water user behavior, 
as defined in EEA Technical Report 
(European Environment Agency, 2013).  
 
In this context, our research highlights 
the fact that given the widespread of DI 
techniques and its high efficiency in the 
use of water among intensive olive 
groves farmers in the Guadalquivir 
basin (as a result of an intense 
modernization process (Aldaya et al., 
2012) and as a conscious strategy of 
farmers to maximize water productivity 
(see Geert and Raes, 2009; Exposito 
and Berbel, 2016)), water pricing seems 
to be ineffective unless tariffs reach a 
disproportionate threshold level. In this 
context, administrative authorities 
should take this fact into account in 
order to develop more effective water 
management policies, such as a reform 
of allocation system of water rights, the 
promotion of water markets (created in 
Spain, but not sufficiently developed), 
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or the conditioning of CAP benefits to 
the fulfillment of specific requirements 
of the WFD regarding water uses and 
savings. 
Nevertheless, some authors take the 
opposite view to the European policy 
makers arguing that the causal 
relationship between low prices and 
waste seems weak, especially in those 
countries or RBDs with inefficient 
conveyance infrastructures and/or 
inefficient tariff structures (i.e. flat 
tariffs rather than volumetric tariffs). In 
general, it has been observed that the 
elasticity of demand for irrigation water 
at current rates is low or negligible (de 
Fraiture and Perry, 2007). Nevertheless, 
we are aware that price ranges are not 
the only determinant of demand 
elasticity, as other factor come into 
play, such as efficiency gains due to 
modernization of irrigation techniques 
(i.e. drip irrigation in our sample of 
intensive olive groves). When water 
efficiency is already high, there is no 
possibility of reducing water use, so 
higher prices will only affect farmers' 
incomes (Berbel et al., 2007). 
In our opinion, two related but separate 
issues concern water pricing and water 
policy. On the one hand, advocates of 
water pricing support the hypothesis 
that water pricing is the solution to 
over-extraction and excessive water use. 
On the other hand, the European Water 
Framework Directive (Art. 5) contains a 
compulsory requirement that the price 
of water should be set according to the 
goal of achieving full cost recovery, 
including environmental and resource 
costs (E&RC). The two arguments are 
compatible with each other, and some 
scholars and environmental activists 
believe that water price is heavily 
subsidised so full cost recovery should 
be enough to solve the problem of over-
exploitation.  
Regarding full cost recovery, the 
evidence in the Guadalquivir River 
Basin shows that financial cost recovery 
is approximately 86% (all uses and 
sources considered) according to the 
Basin Hydrological Plan (CHG 2013). 
Along these lines, Krinner (2014) 
estimates an overall cost recovery rate 
for Spain of 72%. Recently, Borrego-
Marín, Gutiérrez-Martín and Berbel 
(2015) estimated a financial cost 
recovery ratio of 73% for surface water 
in the Guadalquivir Basin, attributing 
the difference to subsidies for 
'modernisation of the water network’. 
Although there is a general consensus 
on achieving a cost recovery rate of 
100%, eliminating subsidies for 
agricultural irrigation, the average 
increase in water cost would be around 
0.04 EUR/m3, from 0.11 to 0.15 
EUR/m3 in the Guadalquivir Basin, 
what would not lead to a significant 
reduction in water demand as shown in 
our case study. 
Some scholars and stakeholder believe 
that the water price should be raised 
above full financial cost recovery, 
including certain eco-taxes that help to 
internalise E&RC. Nevertheless, the 
value of this type of costs is difficult to 
estimate, and there is no commonly-
accepted methodology (Martin-Ortega 
et al. 2011; Gawel 2014). In any case, 
as we have shown, the required increase 
in price in order to impact water 
demand would be disproportionate 
(multiplying the current price by almost 
10) and it would entail a substantial 
reduction in farmers’ income, as they 
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would be required to transfer part of 
their economic surplus to the 
Administration via water tariffs. 
6. Concluding remarks. 
This paper analyses the impact that the 
generalized adoption of deficit irrigation 
strategies has on the water governance 
and water pricing effectiveness. This 
work shows that water demand becomes 
more inelastic after adoption of this 
technology and the consumption does 
not respond to small changes in water 
price because the water demand is 
vertical until water cost reaches a 
threshold price. We have worked upon a 
sample of irrigated olive farmers and 
found that the threshold price upon 
which farmers would demand less 
irrigation water is far above current 
water prices. Consequently, the 
marginal product value of water and the 
threshold price determine the structure 
of water demand and evolve 
independently from water cost. This 
result may be generalized  beyond olive 
irrigated to all crops that use this 
technique (such as almond trees and 
other resintant crops to water scarcity). 
As main conclusion, water pricing is an 
ineffective instrument in areas 
characterized by water scarcity and 
supply restrictions (i.e. in over-
exploited aquifers and basins), as it is 
the case of the Guadalquivir river basin 
in southern Spain (and in many other 
parts of the world with similar climatic 
and hydrological conditions). In our 
case (as in other empirical studies such 
as Berbel and Gómez-Limón (2000), 
Perry (2001) and Ray (2002), the 
elicited threshold price represents a 
disproportionate and unaffordable cost 
of the resource from a social point of 
view. This finding implies significant 
consequences for water management in 
river basins, such as the Guadalquivir 
basin, as water pricing becomes an 
ineffective instrument for managing 
water demand in a context characterised 
by resource scarcity and a generalized 
adoption of deficit irrigation techniques 
by farmers.The paradox is that after the 
adoption of these technologies, water 
demand does not respond to marginal 
and small changes in water price. As a 
result, water pricing is an ineffective 
instrument in areas where water is more 
indispensable, i.e. in over-exploited 
aquifers and basins. 
Our research is based on a case study of 
irrigated olive groves in southern Spain, 
and although it describes a specific case 
and the analyzed sample of interviewed 
farmers may be small, this crop 
represents 50 per cent of irrigated land 
in southern Spain, which is the most 
important agricultural production area 
by value in the country, and it is of 
paramount importance as Spain devotes 
more than 500,000 hectares to low-dose 
irrigated olive groves. Nevertheless, our 
aim is to expand this analysis to a wider 
sample of farmers and  to include global 
basin analysis, as well as other crops 
and locations considering both the 
dynamic nature of basin evolution and 
the complexities of multiple crop 
interactions. Moreover, we are aware 
that the use of water over sustainable 
limits is frequent in closed basins and 
aquifers, and that the farmer’s more 
usual response to decreasing water 
resources is to invest in water saving 
technologies, what includes deficit 
irrigation techniques to adapt to this 
situation. Nevertheless, this behavior 
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may further deteriorate water masses, 
leaving measures of better governance 
to control water abstractions and to 
guarantee sustainable uses of water as 
the only long term solution in water 
scarce areas of the world. 
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